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BOOK REVIEW
Governance, Governmentality, Police, and
Justice: A New Science of Police?
THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE: THE POLICE POWER IN DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE. Edited by Markus D.
Dubber & Mariana Valverde. Stanford University Press,
2006. Pp. vii, 308. $55.00 (hardcover).
MIREILLE HILDEBRANDTt
INTRODUCTION
Originating in fifteenth century French-Burgundy, the
term "police" was first used to describe the governmental
powers of the early modern state (fourteenth to eighteenth
centuries).1 In France, the term was replaced in the
nineteenth century by "administration," and in the course of
the twentieth century "government" came into vogue to
refer to the array of powers produced by and constitutive of
the modern state. By this time, the meaning of the term
''police" was reduced to the constabulary force of the modern
t Associate Professor of Jurisprudence and Legal Theory at Erasmus
University Rotterdam, Dean of Education of the Research School for Safety and
Security, Senior Researcher at the Center for Law Science Technology and
Society Studies at Vrije Universiteit Brussel.
1. Mark Neocleous, Theoretical Foundations of the "New Police Science," in
THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE: THE POLICE POWER IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE 17, 22 (Markus D. Dubber & Mariana Valverde eds., 2006).
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state, resulting from-and giving effect to-the monopoly of
violence. The early use indicates that the term originates
from before Montesquieu's division of powers, and even
today, different claims are made as to the scope of the
power of police: does it refer to the competence of the
executive branch of government only; its legislative
competence regarding issues of public welfare and public
safety; or does it ultimately encompass the power to
govern-including the power to legislate, to punish, and to
adjudicate? Is the power to police-in whatever sense-in
the end a discretionary power that can only be limited by
means of self-limitation, or is the power to police derived
from and restricted by the power to legislate, requiring a
legal basis for every act of government? The first conception
equates police with an undivided sovereignty, the second
subscribes to a legalistic understanding of public competence.
Could it be, alternatively, that the power of police in a
constitutional democracy is the power to exercise the
positive freedom of government to create and sustain both
the negative and positive freedom of the citizens that
constitute the polity? Could it be that such a power of police
is inherently underdetermined (a discretionary power) but
not undetermined (no unlimited discretion)? Would this
resolve the opposition of law and police that seems to be a
red thread in this book? Does it make sense to argue that,
instead of claiming law and police to be incompatible
domains of governmental power, we should understand the
power of police as falling within the scope of the rule of law
(Etat de ciroit) without adhering to a legalistic conception
thereof (Etat ligal)? Or must such claims be dismissed as
dangerous forms of wishful thinking?
All these questions and many more are raised by the
collection of essays that compose the volume under
discussion. The salience of each of the perspectives taken,
the timely appearance, the diversity of approaches, and the
combination of historical detail and theoretical courage
make this book compulsory reading for students and
scholars of criminology, criminal law, political science and
theory, and the history of law and government. Though
clearly written for an audience familiar with Anglo-
American legal traditions, the perspectives taken are often
inspired by continental European authors such as Schmitt,
558 [Vol. 56
A NEW SCIENCE OF POLICE?
Foucault, Agamben, Negri and Hardt, Latour, as well as
Colquhoun, Smith, and Blackstone. 2 Though seemingly
focused on domestic powers of the modern state, two highly
topical contributions demonstrate the relevance of "police
science" for military operations in the age of international
terrorism and the resurgence of the idea of just war.3 In
fact, the diversity expounded in this volume circles around
a concept of police that refers to a set of distinct but
overlapping concepts like governance, governmentality,
political economy, security, prevention, repression,
regulation, and sovereignty. They originate from very
different discourses about the mechanisms by which well-
ordered and not so well-ordered societies flourish or suffer.
Doubts can be expressed as to whether there is enough
family resemblance between the different conceptions of"police" to justify the idea that this volume presents "the"
new police science, and one also wonders in which respect
the theoretical analyses presented deserve the title of
"science." However, though a label like "police theory" could
instantly clarify which kind of investigations are at stake
here, I will argue that good reasons can be given for the
idea that this book indeed provides us with a coherent idea
of a new science of police.
The book has an excellent introduction that aptly leads
the way into the different chapters and an interesting final
chapter that evaluates the achievements of the volume.4 I
shall not repeat this exercise. Instead, this Review is
organized in three Parts that aim to provide a survey of
what is at stake in the volume without pretending to
uncover a common core that may in fact be missing. Three
thematic Parts should offer the analytic framework to
2. The book has been written by authors from the United States, Canada,
Europe, and Australia: Markus Dubber, John Hagan, Christopher Tomlins, and
Pasquale Pasquino teach in the United States; Alan Hunt, Ron Levi, and
Mariana Valverde in Canada; Mark Neocleous, Lindsay Farmer, and Pasquale
Pasquino in Europe; and Mitchell Dean in Australia.
3. Mitchell Dean, Military Intervention as "Police" Action?, in THE NEW
POLICE SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 185; Ron Levi & John Hagan, International
Police, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 207.
4. Markus D. Dubber & Mariana Valverde, Introduction: Perspectives on the
Power and Science of Police, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 1;
Christopher Tomlins, Framing the Fragments: Police: Genealogies, Discourses,
Locales, Principles, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 248.
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interconnect different chapters, digging up the transversal
themes that make this book such an interesting endeavor.
The aim of the Review is not to offer a precise description of
its contents but, rather, to open a debate on some of the
points made. In fact, the diversity of the contents and the
abundance of relevant points made forced me to make a
choice of which issues to pursue to prevent remaining on
the surface of things. After the Introduction, Part I
discusses the concept of police as an essentially contested
concept-confronting the repeated claim that the "police" is
unlimited by definition and thus indefinable by nature.
This Part will also touch upon the question of whether the
study of police in its broader scope should be understood as
a science and termed a "new police science" while keeping
in mind that the undertaking of the authors seems at odds
with the objectives of the old "Polizeiwissenschaften" of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Part II recounts the
way that Dubber masterfully traces the historical roots of
the power to police in the patria potestas of the householder.
Complementing his account, I will discuss the concept of
suzerainty as a crucial entry into the meaning of
sovereignty. I will argue that the patria potestas belongs to
the age of suzerainty and the preceding age of the Germanic
non-state society and cannot be equated with the power of
police that fits the era of sovereignty without further
qualification. This qualification relates to the internal
division of sovereignty as envisioned in the substantive
conception of the Rechtsstaat, a point to be discussed in
Part III, The Core Dichotomy: Law and Police. This Part
will move into the fact that many of the authors presume
that law and police are mutually exclusive domains of
regulation-mostly building on a legalistic conception of
law that seems powerless in the face of the state of
emergency that calls for an effectively unhampered exercise
of the power to police as well as in the face of an emerging
transnational governmentality. I will claim that the
opposition is forgetful of the move from what the French
called the Etat I6gal to the Etat de droit. With this I mean
that law does not imply legalism and that discretion is not
necessarily exercised outside of the empire of law.
5 I will
then finish with concluding remarks.
5. Suspecting me of affinity with Dworkin's empire is not altogether
unjustified. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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I. THE COURAGE OF OUR ANACHRONISMS
A. Back to the Old Notion of Police
In chapter one, Theoretical Foundations of the "New
Police Science," Mark Neocleous discusses the concept of
police and the idea of a new police science. 6 Being aware
that the modern usage of the word "police" refers to the
constabulary force, he argues against the ensuing reduction
of police-studies "to the study of crime and law enforcement
* . .[which leads to them being] absorbed into the discipline
of criminology," 7 and against "the empirical mode and
policy-oriented focus of what has passed as 'police studies.' ' 8
The problem of reducing police-studies to a branch of
criminology is that it isolates the police from other practices
of power while political science itself has abstained from
serious study of the police. 9 So Neocleous seeks what he
calls a pre-disciplinary understanding of police focusing on"police" in the old sense of the word and depicting the aim
of modern government as the production of a well-ordered
society. From its inception at the beginnings of modernity,
the term "police" denoted what we would now call
government or administration, nourishing on the idea that
society can be molded into a more prosperous order and
eventually, such police was bent on enlarging what Adam
Smith coined the "wealth of nations."'10 The police, in that
anachronistic sense, is meant to enhance the general
welfare of a people by means of often detailed regulation of
social and economic life including the technological
infrastructure, the distribution of space, and the mobility
within and between territories.1 1 From this perspective,
police and police science are connected with the science of
political economy as initiated in the seventeenth century by
6. Neocleous, supra note 1, at 17-41.
7. Id. at 17.
8. Id. at 18.
9. Id. at 19.
10. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 562 (R. L. Meek et al. eds.,
1978); see also Lindsay Farmer, The Jurisprudence of Security: The Police
Power and the Criminal Law, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 145.
11. See Farmer, supra note 10, at 146.
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Smith and with the science of cameralism-practiced from
the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries in Germany,
of which the Polizeiwissenschaften originally formed a
part.1 2 Those were the "old police sciences" that inspired the
courageous anachronism13 of "the new police science" in the
title of this volume.
The proposed usage of the concept of "police" invites
connotations with a range of contemporary terms-notably,
politics, policy, empire, governance, and governmentality.
The reader is thus confronted with Dubber's explicit
separation of the realm of politics (self-government of free
and independent peers) from the realm of police (the
authoritarian rule of the household and the state);14 the less
explicit mingling of policy and police in the discussion of
Colquhoun's analysis of the necessity of poverty for a
prosperous civilization; 15 Adam Smith's analysis of the role
of "the management of the economy and the production of
social wealth" for the control of crime;' 6 various uses of the
term "empire" (the Holy Roman Empire of the middle ages
and early modernity;' 7 Hardt and Negri's emerging global
empire based on the juridical notion of the state of
exception;18  and the colonial (British) empire' 9 ); the
12. See Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Politics, Policy and Policey as Concepts in
English and Continental Languages: An Attempt to Explain Divergences, 48
REV. POL. 3, 16 (1986). Regarding cameralism, the German science of the
economics of government, which "saw in the welfare of the state the source of all
other welfare," see ALBION W. SMALL, THE CAMERALISTS: THE PIONEERS OF
GERMAN SOcIAL POLITY, at viii (1909).
13. See Neocleous, supra note 1, at 18.
14. Markus D. Dubber, The New Police Science and the Police Power Model
of the Criminal Process, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 107.
15. See Neocleous, supra note 1, at 30-31.
16. See Farmer, supra note 10, at 146.
17. Starting from the coronation of Charlemagne in 800 A.D., Frankish and
later German emperors have considered themselves to be successors to the
Roman emperors claiming the ensuing imperial powers until the imperial title
was renounced in 1806. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE
FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 89, 483 (1983).
18. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 26 (2000); see also Dean,
supra note 3, at 186.
19. See Mariana Valverde, Peace, Order, and Good Government: Policelike
Powers in Postcolonial Perspective, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE, supra note 1, at
73.
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Foucaldian notion of governmentality which refers to an
array of governmental techniques challenging grandiose
concepts-like sovereignty-while entailing a logic distinct
from the rights discourse of liberal democracy; 20 and the
topical notion of governance-originating from the
discourse of corporate business management, referring to
the effective management of public and/or private
enterprises, including the state.21 A reader that has not
been initiated into the language games from which these
concepts have been mined may be at a loss since familiarity
with these concepts seems to be taken for granted. As this
is not a textbook, some vorverstandnis may be presumed on
the side of the reader, but as the different chapters draw on
different academic discourses in which similar terms have
alternative meanings, confusion is probable. The ambition
to develop a pre-disciplinary science for a post-disciplinary
age22 turns out to require an extensive trans-disciplinary
background. Since this new police science aims to broaden
the scope of contemporary police and policy studies that
tend to engage in a rather narrow social science enterprise,
more explanation of the basic terminologies employed is
warranted.
B. The Offspring of the Polis
"Politics," "police," "policy," and "polite" all derive from
the Greek politeia (government) and polis (city-state), just
like "civics,". "civil," "civilized," and "civil society" derive
from the Latin civitas (citizenship).23 It seems most
interesting that "politics," "policy," "police," and "polite" all
share the same root, especially when we take note of the
fact that the French and the Germans have no separate
20. See Farmer, supra note 10, at 149.
21. Governance is generally considered to function in a networked
environment as compared to government which is associated with top-down
models of governing. See, e.g., Mark Bevir & Rod Rhodes, Decentering British
Governance: From Bureaucracy to Networks 1, 17 (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Inst. of
Governmental Studies, Working Paper No. 2001-11, 2001), available at
http://igs.berkeley.edulpublications/workingpapers/WP2001-11.pdf.
22. See Neocleous, supra note 1, at 19.
23. See Heidenheimer, supra note 12, at 4 on the Greek roots. For the Latin,
see the entry for "civitias" in Encyclopaedia Britannica Online,
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9082770 (last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
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terms for "politics" and "policy" (both referred to as politique
and Politik respectively).24 An interesting study has been
made of this curious situation in which Heidenheimer
relates the continental use of one term for two concepts to
the more prominent role of a hierarchical state that
unilaterally decides issues of public order:
As the absolutist states assured internal order and security under
the label of Policey they approached a situation in which internally
there was "literally only Policey, and no longer any Politik," in the
characterization of Carl Schmitt. "Politik in the larger sense, high
Politik, was then only foreign Politik, which the sovereign state
conducted with other sovereign states."
2 5
The diversity of the offspring of the Greek term polis, as
well as their common root, are a salient indication of the
complexity and ambiguity we may encounter when
inquiring into the historical dynamics of the power of police.
Further questions can be raised as to the difference
between the police and the power of police: is the police-in
the sense used here-aptly described as a function, as a
power, as a competence, as a means to achieve order, or as
the purpose of government (the promotion of welfare and
security)? Is there a difference between the power of police
and the power to police; the first being a competence, the
second being a bare fact? The authors have found an
interesting way out of the need for analytical rigor by
claiming that the police and the power of police are
indefinable, 26 a point to which we will return below.
C. The Productive Dimension of the Police
One of the most salient features of this book is the way
the police is held to be a positive, productive force within
24. Id. at 6.
25. Id. at 14 (quoting CARL SCHMIT, DER BEGRIFF DES POLITISCHEN 10-11
(1963)). The absolute (police) states of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
integrated the concepts of police, policy, and politics into one unilateral and
undivided power of government.
26. In my opinion, analytical rigor is interesting in as far as it raises our
awareness of significant issues. I would not, however, promote attempts to
petrify the usage of terms or conceptual nitpicking for its own sake. There is too
much at stake to pretend that the use of concepts is a purely technical
endeavor.
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the modern state. If the contributions have a common core,
this is it. The recent reduction of police to the ensemble of
police officers reduces the police to a negative, reactive force
that prevents and represses disturbances of the social
order. The return to the old concept of police (government in
a very broad sense) allows one to unveil the constructive
dimension of the police that may be of far greater interest
to the distribution of risk and opportunities than its role in
the maintenance of an existing order.
Initially, before the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), the
police consisted of rather ad hoc reactive interventions in
public life.27 The advent of the absolute state after the
Westphalian Peace Treaty of 1648 entailed a police power
that was "aimed not just at the maintenance or
reproduction of order but to its fabrication" and "less
concerned with re-forming . . . and much more concerned
with actively shaping' the social order. 28 Having regulated
the issue of external sovereignty in the said treaty, the
power of police finally flourished within the confines of an
internal sovereignty. This internal sovereignty-dependent
on the pacification of a population by means of the
monopoly of violence-turned everybody into the subject of
a sovereign. 29 As the objective of this sovereign was
supposed to be the welfare of its people, the res publica, the
establishment of sovereignty called for an increasing body
of enacted laws to be enforced by a growing bureaucracy to
ensure the transformation of social order aligned with the
dictates of the enlightened sovereign. 30 Though it may not
be news for historians, it could be elucidating for lawyers to
realize that there is a rather straightforward continuity
between the eighteenth century police states and the
twentieth century welfare states 31 to be found in the need to
create ever more new regulations-the implementation of
which requires even more sophisticated monitoring and
27. See Neocleous, supra note 1, at 25-26.
28. Id. at 26; see also Levi & Hagan, supra note 3, at 210.
29. Mireille Hildebrandt, Trial and 'Fair Trial'.- From Peer to Subject to
Citizen, in 2 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: JUDGMENT AND CALLING TO ACCOUNT 15-37
(Antony Duff et al. eds., 2006).
30. See SIMONE GOYARD-FABRE, JEAN BODIN ET LE DROIT DE LA RPUBLIQUE
(1989); see also infra Part II (discussing suzerainty and sovereignty).




Obviously, the productive dimension of the police power
has its risks depending on the kind of society it establishes
and the kind of checks and balances it incorporates. At the
same time, however, this dimension has the potential to
empower citizens and to enlarge the scope for their
emancipation by means of the creation of specific socio-
technical infrastructures. Alan Hunt's Police and the
Regulation of Traffic: Policing as a Civilizing Process? in
chapter six is a nice example of the importance of such
mundane activities as traffic monitoring which has in fact
been the precondition for the explosion of mobility that
developed since the nineteenth century.33 At this point, the
book clearly hinges on two thoughts: one that acknowledges
and illustrates the need for the fabrication of social order
and is willing to appreciate the constructive dimension of
the police; 34 and another that is suspicious of the results of
this productive dimension, suggesting that such
appreciation is, at best, naive. 35
Regarding the illiberal coercive power that seems
inherent in the power of police, Mariana Valverde makes a
very interesting point in her contribution, Peace, Order and
Good Government: Policelike Powers in Postcolonial
Perspective.36  In describing the peculiar relationship
between Canada and the United Kingdom in terms of the
transposition of colonial police powers of the former
imperial sovereign to the Canadian government, she
32. See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO
IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 82 (1998) (discussing the
construction of the (nation) state and the welfare state with their monitoring
powers); JOHN TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE,
CITIZENSHIP AND THE STATE 116 (2000).
33. Alan Hunt, Police and the Regulation of Traffic: Policing as a Civilizing
Process?, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 168. Interestingly, a
study has been published on the civilizing process regarding the security that is
a precondition for the existence of the (national) state-a highly relevant topic
for a new police science. IAN LOADER & NEIL WALKER, CIVILIZING SECURITY
(2007).
34. See Hunt, supra note 33, at 182; see also Dean, supra note 3, at 201; Levi
& Hagan, supra note 3, at 238.
35. See Tomlins, supra note 4, at 252 (warning against uncritical trust in
the law's capacity to provide remedies against the power of police).
36. Valverde, supra note 19, at 73.
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illustrates how this transposition is not necessarily a "zero-
sum game. ' 37 In fact, in describing what she calls the
"history of the present" of Canada's deferential attitude to
government authority, she demonstrates a multiplication of
police power between different levels of government.38
Valverde thus uncovers yet another way in which police
power can be productive; not just generating social welfare
or general safety, but also reproducing itself at another
level of governance. 39 This could be a very fertile insight
when studying the emerging power of police at the
international, supranational, and transnational levels that
will be discussed in Part II.D, From National Sovereignty to
Global Empire? It should prevent us from presuming that
new powers of police at the transnational level imply a loss
of sovereign power for the nation state. In keeping with
Valverde, no general conclusion can be drawn here as she
invites lawyers to analyze the actual "flows, exchanges, and
transformations of knowledge and power that are the lifeblood
of both 'high' law and everyday law enforcement" 40-thus
introducing a Latourian way of studying the law.
D. The Undefinability and the Unlimited Nature of the
Power of Police
Related to the productive dimension of the police is the
recurrent claim that it is unlimited by definition and for
that reason, cannot be limited.41 Though its workings can
be enumerated-from water management to civil registration,
traffic regulation, taxation, social security, etc.-in the end,
its scope cannot be determined. 42 The productive dimension
ventures into the future, anticipating potential effects of
intended measures-always on the verge of the unknown
that must be mastered to prevent mishaps and to create
new opportunities. The indefinable nature of the power to
37. Id. at 74-75.
38. Id. at 100-02.
39. Id. at 79.
40. Valverde, supra note 19, at 75.
41. See Dubber & Valverde, supra note 4, at 1.
42. See id. at 4.
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police is a starting point for many of the contributions. 43
The indeterminacy of the concept of the police may at first
seem to be a conceptual issue indicating that what we have
here is a vague term, denoting phenomena that have some
family resemblance but not necessarily a common core. To
artificially construct a common core would hide important
aspects of the police by placing them outside the definition.
Most of the authors, for this reason, rightly reject a formal
definition of what they mean by "police." This does not
imply that anything goes as far as the meaning of "police" is
concerned; rather, it suggests that we are dealing with
what Gallie has termed "an essentially contested concept":
the term easily evokes evaluative dimensions and its
application depends on the context of use.44 These
conditions are not specific for the police-in fact, the
concept of law is equally vague and indefinable. Uwe Wesel
once exclaimed that answering the question, "What in fact
is law? ... is as simple as nailing a pudding to the wall."45
To come to grips with the law equally implies evaluative
considerations, and its usage will also vary depending on
the historical and cultural context. 46 In relation to the
power of police, I would argue that this power is
underdetermined because of its inherent need for discretion
but, therefore, not necessarily unlimited as some of the
authors claim. The idea that the power of police is
unlimited must not be conflated with the issue of
conceptual undefinability. The notion of being unlimited
draws on the proposition that the law depends on the power
to police because it is understood to historically precede the
law and because of its supposedly unrestricted
43. See Neocleous, supra note 1, at 20; see also Dubber, supra note 14, at
109 (arguing that law may limit the use of the power to police but not its scope);
Farmer, supra note 10, at 154.
44. W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 167 (1956).
45. UWE WESEL, FRUHFORMEN DES RECHTS IN VORSTAATLICHEN
GESELLSCHAFTEN 52 (1985) ("Was ist eigentlich Recht? Eine Antwort ist ahnlich
einfach wie der bekannte Versuch, einen Pudding an die Wand zu nageln.").
Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
46. Cf. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD (2d ed. 2004);
DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 410 (asserting that as the law does not speak for
itself, interpretation is the core enterprise for the judge); CLIFFORD GEERTZ,
LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
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discretionary power. The most sophisticated philosophical
argument for this position is Carl Schmitt's notion of
sovereignty, of which the power to police seems to be an
attribute or even a synonym. According to Schmitt, the
sovereign is the one that decides about the state of
emergency (or exception), initiating the moment when the
law is suspended.47 Neocleous and many of the other
authors follow the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben at
this point who wrote a compelling analysis of what he calls
the homo sacer-a notion of ancient Roman law depicting a
person that is outlawed by his fellows and thus placed
outside the protection of the law. 48 Agamben had the-
rhetorically-brilliant idea to connect the notion of
outlawry with Foucault's discussions of "bio-power"-which
is the power exercised over the "naked" bodies of a
population unprotected by the legal subjectivity (persona)
that shields their vulnerable bodies of flesh and blood from
the monitoring gaze of disciplinary practices. 49  To
Agamben, the most salient demonstration of the workings
of such bio-power is what he calls the "camp"-exemplified
in the Nazi concentration camps. 50 Building on Schmitt's
notion of sovereignty, he depicts the homo sacer as the
naked body that is under the rule of police and outside the
domain of law: illegal immigrants, illegal enemy
combatants, and other subjects that are in fact objectified to
an extent no longer compatible with the notion of the
human person. 51 In having the power to suspend the rule of
law in states of emergency, the sovereign is both inside and
outside the domain of law: the choice to define a situation
as an emergency is his own and cannot be contested as this
contestation depends on the (re)instatement of the rule of
law.52 In other words, the law does not rule, the sovereign
47. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 5-9 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2005) (1922).
48. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 8
(Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998) (1995).
49. Id. at 5; see also Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, in 1 THE
WILL TO KNOWLEDGE (1998). Agamben's connection may be rhetorically brilliant
but historically and theoretically problematic. See infra Part II.D.
50. AGAMBEN, supra note 49, at 166-68.
51. Id. at 26-27.
52. This is-of course-Schmitt's position elaborated in supra note 48.
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rules. He can do this by means of law or by other means
depending on his arbitrary will; in the police state, the
prince rules according to his arbitrary will (le bon plaisir du
prince).53 Agamben-and most of the authors-seems not to
believe in the rule of law or to equate it with a rule by law
(legalism). Throughout the book, law and police are claimed
to be separate domains, and the reader may get the feeling
that those who advocate legal regulation, human rights,
and international law are obfuscating the actual workings
of the police. The legal discourse is seen as a way to
legitimize disciplinary practices that follow a logic
inherently opposed to the fundamental principles of law.
We may detect some deeply Foucaldian intuitions at this
point which I suspect of obfuscating the productive force of
the law and the complex interrelation between law and
police in constitutional democracy. I will return to this point
in the section on The Core Opposition: Law and Police.
54
E. Police Theory or Police Science?
One can question the label attached to the studies
undertaken in this volume. 55 Neocleous reminds the reader
that the original Polizeiwissenschaften (police sciences) of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were meant to
sustain and improve the powers of the police, consisting of
elaborate advice to the bureaucrats of the modern state. 56
The police science presented in this volume, however, aims
to develop a more critical understanding of the scope and
exercise of the power to police. Its methodology seems at
odds with the rationalism of the cameralist science as
developed within the framework of German mercantilism,
inclining towards political and social theory with strong
critical incentives. Foucault and Agamben have inspired
many of the authors while repeated reference to Adam
Agamben refers to Schmitt throughout his book. For example, see AGAMBEN,
supra note 49, at 15.
53. The notion of le bon plaisir du prince refers to the unlimited
discretionary powers of eighteenth century absolutism, cf. JACQUES CHEVALLIER,
L'ETAT DE DROIT 16 (2d ed. 1994).
54. See infra Part III.
55. See Neocleous, supra note 1, at 21; see also Tomlins, supra note 4, at
279-81.
56. Neocleous, supra note 1, at 21.
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Smith links the project to political economy in a very broad
sense, emphasizing the relationship between police,
welfare, and the state. Does this imply that the notion of a
"police theory" would better indicate the kind of research
presented here and should therefore replace the concept of a
"police science"? If we follow a strict division of tasks
between empirical sciences and discursive humanities, we
should indeed prefer to speak of a police theory in line with
social and cultural theory. However, such disciplinary
distributions are problematic in the light of the project that
is at stake here. It may, for instance, suggest that the
discussions do not count as scientifically valid and need not
be taken seriously by those involved in the construction of
scientific knowledge. The whole project would thus fall prey
to the monopolistic tendencies of the paradigms of the
natural sciences, 57 discrediting the explicit argument to
reinvent a pre-disciplinary-or rather, post-disciplinary-
perspective on the police. 58 One can argue that a police
theory, as practiced in a trans-disciplinary academic
community of lawyers, social scientists, social and political
theorists, historians, and others, in fact requires adherence
to scientific standards like sound argumentation, accurate
and relevant reference to one's sources, visible awareness of
relevant research in the area of investigation, contestability
of one's findings in the sense of being open to relevant
counter arguments, and a willingness to explain the
assumptions of one's research. As a matter of fact, such
scientific standards would imply that empirical research
consisting of large scale statistical surveys does not
necessarily produce scientific knowledge. Whether this is
the case will depend on whether the research involves
serious argumentation-for instance, argumentation
regarding the qualifications that precede quantification or
argumentation regarding the relationship between
statistical significance and scientific relevance in the
specific domain that is under investigation. By speaking of
a "police science," the authors seem to have taken a stance
57. For a farewell to outdated paradigms of the natural sciences, including
an opening to find middle ground with the social sciences, see ILYA PRIGOGINE &
ISABELLE STENGERS, ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: MAN'S NEW DIALOGUE WITH NATURE
(1984).
58. See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 14, at 108; Hunt, supra note 33, at 168;
Neocleous, supra note 1, at 19; Valverde, supra note 19, at 102.
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in a debate about the nature of scientific research, rejecting
empiricist or rationalist monopolies on scientific knowledge
production. Considering the claims they make about the
uncritical character of the old police sciences, as well as the
reductive nature of the present focus on empirical policy
studies, this rejection makes sense as central to their
project.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE: SUZERAINTY AND
SOVEREIGNTY
A. From "Mirrors of Princes" to Police Science
In chapter two, Spiritual and Earthly Police: Theories
of the State in Early Modern Europe,59 Pasquale Pasquino
discusses two handbooks of early-modern Protestant
Germany, providing an interesting insight into the practical
bearings of the emerging police science of the second half of
the seventeenth century. 60 Written by high ranking civil
servants with little interest in theoretical exploration such
as practiced by Bodin or Hobbes, the authors tried to come
to terms with the demands of a Christian polity as a
hierarchically ordered territorial state. 61 As Pasquino
remarks, these expositions differ substantially from the
medieval "mirror of princes" (Furstenspiegel) which
basically provided advice to a ruler (prince) to develop the
right character (virtues) in order to rule successfully. 62
Instead of addressing the person who rules, the treatises
discussed by Pasquino address techniques of governing and
"the first rudimentary elements of an administrative
science." 63 This shift, from addressing the personal power to
police of medieval times to addressing the more abstract
59. Pasquale Pasquino, Spiritual and Earthly Police: Theories of the State in
Early-Modern Europe, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 42.
60. Id. at 42 (discussing Dietrich Reinkingk's BIBLISCHE POLICEY and Veit
Ludwig Seckendorff s TEUTSCHER FORSTENSTAAT).
61. See id. at 43-44, 53-54.
62. Id. at 56; see, e.g., PHILIPPUS DE LEYDIs, TRACTATUS DE CURA REIPUBLICAE
ET SORTE PRINCIPANTIS (written in 1355 for Duke William, vassal of the German
Emperor); NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, IL PRINCIPE (written in 1513 for Lorenzo die
Piero de Medici, ruler of Florence).
63. Pasquino, supra note 60, at 56.
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and distant powers of the police states of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, is crucial for understanding the
police power in the modern state which cannot be equated
with the restricted policing powers of the medieval kings.
To explain the difference, we need to briefly explore the
move from suzerainty to sovereignty at the threshold of
modernity.
B. The Pater Familias as Lord, Peer, and Vassal
In chapter four, The New Police Science and the Police
Power Model of the Criminal Process, Markus Dubber
develops the idea that the governance of the modern state
can be seen in continuity with the rule of the head of the
patriarchal household6 4 which are both concerned with the
"public police and economy" of their realm. In the words of
William Blackstone:
By the public police and economy I mean the due regulation and
domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the individuals of the
state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to
conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good
neighborhood and good manners, and to be decent, industrious and
inoffensive in their respective stations.65
Dubber has argued this position in The Police Power,
and takes the opportunity to extend his analysis here with
regard to the criminal process. His point has been made by
the German legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch and the
German sociologist Max Weber who claimed that the
origins of the criminal law should not be located in the
64. Dubber, supra note 14, at 107-08 (using the term "governance" when
referring to the similarity between the government of the modern state and the
government of the pater familias, speaking of patriarchal governance; this is
confusing because the similarity consists in the top-down model of government
which is exemplary of the powers of a bureaucratic government rather than the
mix of peer-to-peer, top-down, and bottom-up models of power that is exemplary
of governance in a networked environment).
65. MARKUS D. DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, at xii (2005) (quoting Commonwealth
v. McHale, 97 Pa. 397 (1881)); see also Christopher Tomlins, To Improve the
State and Condition of Man: The Power to Police and the History of American
Governance, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1215 (2005) (reviewing MARKUS D. DUBBER, THE




private revenge of peers in a non-state society, but in the
jurisdiction these peers exercised as lords over the serfs
belonging to their estate (household).
66
Though the relationship between lord and serf was not
one of slavery, the lord had a kind of absolute power of
police over those belonging to his household including the
power to punish according to his own discretion. 67 Apart
from self-limitation, this power of police was subject to no
constraints "except insofar as [the head of the household]
proved himself unfit for his post."
68
In the concluding chapter, Framing the Fragments:
Police: Genealogies, Discourses, Locales, Principles,
Christopher Tomlins writes that "Dubber's reading of the
state . . . [as] the patriarchal household enfolding micro
households . . . ignores aspects of the Aristotelian
representation of oikoi that ... make possible the ... polis,
a space not of hierarchy but of equality, freedom, and
virtuous civic participation. ' 69 The micro households do not
necessarily reproduce a macro household with the same
logic.7 0 Tomlins thus suggests that Dubber's equation of the
police powers of the modern state with the patria potestas of
a pater familias is problematic. 71 Though I would agree that
constitutional democracy contains constitutive constraints
absent in the patriarchal household, to which I will return
in Part III, Law and Police, I do think that Dubber's
analogy with the police powers of the lord over his serfs
makes sense. To clarify why this is the case, we need to
make a small historical excursion into the feudal middle
66. GUSTAV RADBRUCH, ELEGANTIAE JURIS CRIMINALIS 1-13 (1950); MAX
WEBER, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 241-63 (Johannes Winkelmann ed., 1960); see also P.
W. A. IMMINK, AT THE ROOTS OF MEDIEVAL SOCIETY I: THE WESTERN EMPIRE 9-81
(1958); MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, VRIJHEID EN STRAF: ONTSTAAN EN ONTWIKKELING
VAN STRAF EN STRAFRECHT IN HET DENKEN VAN P.W.A. IMMINK (1908-1965)
(2005).
67. DUBBER, supra note 66, at 44 ("[T]he householder's power was
essentially arbitrary, as well as broad. This meant that it was not susceptible to
prior definition.").
68. Dubber, supra note 14, at 110.
69. Tomlins, supra note 4, at 260. See Tomlins, supra note 4, at 259 for a
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ages.
The relationship between lord and serf to which
Radbruch and Weber refer originates in the Germanic non-
state society preceding the age of suzerainty. This non-state
society had two realms of governance. First, we have the
assembly of independent lords who discussed issues of
public concern in the Germanic Thing.72 The assembly
convened as peers, since being a lord meant that one did not
recognize the authority of any other peer. This public
intercourse constituted a political realm of free and equal
heads of households.7 3 This political realm is similar to the
polis, a "space ... of equality, freedom" 74 to which Tomlins
refers. Other than Tomlins's "Aristotelian representation of
oikoi, that . . . make[s] possible . . . virtuous civic
participation,"75 the peers of the Germanic assembly did not
represent their household and were not involved in civic
participation as they were neither civilians nor citizens. 76
Second, every lord exercised the patria potestas over his
household, acting as pater familias over his subjects (family
and serfs). This constituted a realm of police within the
confines of the household. The lord was thus at the nexus of
politics and police, acting as a free and independent agent
within the domain of his peers and acting as the one in
authority in the domain of his household. With the advent
of the Frankish kingdoms, the non-state Germanic society
was transformed into a society in which one of the lords
claimed authority over the others as their king, requiring
their oath of personal loyalty. This oath provided the king
with their auxilium et consilium (assistance and advice) in
exchange for which they fell within the mund (peace) of the
72. See the entry "thing" in Encyclopaedia Britannica Online,
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9072133/thing (last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
73. See DUBBER, supra note 66, at 3; HILDEBRANDT, supra note 67, at 26
(discussing the allod (estate) as the foundation of (1) the public authority of a
lord over his serfs and (2) the exercise of his political rights within the
Germanic Thing (referring to P. W. A. IMMINK, LA LIBERTP, ET LA PEINE 30
(1973))).
74. Tomlins, supra note 4, at 260.
75. Id.
76. Id. Also see CORNELIUS TACITUS, GERMANIA 171 (J.B. Rives trans., 1999),
written at the end of the first century (remarking in chapter 11 that when the




king. In fact, their allod (domain, estate) became part of the
king's domain, which he, however, lent back to them as a
feud (a domain held in tenure), turning them into his
vassals while they remained lord to their serfs. Thus, a new
situation emerged in which the king was the overlord or
suzerain of the other lords, establishing a very peculiar
asymmetrical reciprocity between former peers.
Interestingly, initially the suzerain could not claim any
authority over the subjects of his vassals who now found
themselves at the nexus of two realms once again: (1) a
political sphere in which they were subjects of a king and (2)
a political sphere in which they were lord over their serfs.
Within the royal sphere, they were subject to the emerging
power of police of the suzerain which was initially very
limited due to the fragile balance of powers between the
king and his often powerful vassals. Within the sphere of
the household, they were exercising their own power of
police-though at some point criminal jurisdiction was
extended to the royal sphere. In non-state societies, as well
as in the age of suzerainty, the governmental powers
derived, to a large extent, from the adjudicative
interventions of the lord or overlord. They ruled by holding
court.77 In the course of the late middle ages, the suzerain
kings used the royal jurisdiction to get a better grip on their
vassals (forbidding private revenge) and their vassals'
subjects (initiating a royal complaints jurisdiction which
gradually took over the adjudication of disputes between
subjects of the overlords' vassals). The hallmark of the
governance model of the suzerain was adjudication,
implying a weak type of government in need of constant
negotiations between the suzerain and his vassals. The
adjudication in this era was participatory. 78 To claim that
in this situation the king ruled his vassals or their subjects
as a pater familias with arbitrary powers of police would be
missing the point entirely: it is only with the advent of
sovereignty that the kings managed to establish a
substantial power of police over both the lords and their
77. See BERMAN, supra note 17, at 88.
78. See id. at 324-28 (discussing participatory adjudication in the manor);
see also id. at 307-10 (discussing participatory justice in the feudal legal order
that constitutes suzerainty). This type of adjudication was exemplary for the
limited powers of the suzerain. See, e.g., id. at 68 ("The king had to beg and
pray, as Maitland put it, for he could not command and punish.").
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subjects, turning them into equals in relationship to his
plenitudo potestas.
C. From Suzerainty to Sovereignty
To understand sovereignty as a radically new type of
power-even if proclaimed to continue the imperial powers
of the Roman Emperors-we can take recourse to Jean
Bodin's Six livres de la Ripublique (1576). 79 In this treatise,
Bodin explains the radically new foundation of royal power
in the concept of sovereignty which he considers to be the
precondition for the management of the res publica while
understanding the king not as a person, but as the highest
office.80 His concept of sovereignty is composed of three
layers. First, la puissance publique de commandement (the
public power to command) recognizes the power to legislate
as the first attribute of the sovereign (rather than the
suzerain's limited powers of adjudication), implying a
unilateral competence to command while rejecting the
reciprocal relationship between lord and vassal. Second, la
continuit6 de la puissance publique (the durability of the
public power) makes the power to command dependent on
the office of the king instead of his person, thus creating a
new type of legal certainty beyond the fragility of a human
person. Third, la puissance absolue (the absolute power)
guarantees the impartiality of the royal office from powerful
lords that may distract the king from serving the res
publica (internal sovereignty) while also referring to the
notion of independence with regard to other states (external
sovereignty). In fact, after the conclusion of the
Westphalian Peace Treaty of 1648, sovereign states were
seen to be the only answer to the religious wars that were
devastating early modern Europe, establishing the
foundations for a realm of public international law. The
mutual recognition of sovereign states as mutually
independent actors in an international arena in which no
state could claim authority over another, was thus made
possible by a conceptualization of sovereignty in continuity
79. Cf. GOYARD-FABRE, supra note 30, at 159-73.
80. See generally ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S TWO BODIES: A STUDY
IN MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957) (discussing the ground-breaking
study of the difference between the person and the office of the king).
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with the freedom and independence of the former pater
familias. As in the case of the Germanic assembly of equally
independent lords, this realm of international law leads to
either war, or consent in the case of interstate conflicts,
because the exercise of police power is reserved for domestic
affairs presuming a power to command which is absent
between peers. Notably, Bodin does not think that the
powers of the king are unlimited. Despite claiming royal
power to be absolute, Bodin recognizes three restrictions on
royal competence: (1) divine and natural laws, (2) the
fundamental laws of the monarchy, and (3) respect for
private property. However, the sovereign could not be called
to account for keeping within these limits by anyone but
God-he could not be forced to obey even his own law by
another human person. This again signifies an interesting
continuity: in the realm of international law we have no
supranational authority to enforce the law to which parties
have voluntarily agreed. Though states are legally bound by
international law, its enforcement depends on their
willingness to comply and on existing power relations. This
creates a tension evident in Bodin's modern emphasis on
absolute powers combined with his medieval reference to
certain limitations. This tension is aptly described for
modern international relations by Ron Levi and John
Hagan in chapter eight on International Police. Their aim is
to understand "the possibilities and limits of a presently
emerging transnational legal field, that of international
criminal law."8 1 Their default position is that
[P]rograms for international reform are often imagined as purely a
question of police, so that questions of law ... are displaced in the
process ... [and] programs to promote international law are often
invested with a wide array of legal tools and juridical authority
but are provided no powers of 'police' through which this authority
can be effectively mobilized.
82
Though I will return to the challenges of transnational
violence to the concept of sovereignty,8 3 it should be clear
that the idea of a sovereign state basically rules out
transnational interventions of police. In fact, the relations
81. Levi & Hagan, supra note 3, at 209.
82. Id.
83. See infra Part IID.
578 [Vol. 56
A NEW SCIENCE OF POLICE?
between sovereign states demand a rule of law without the
power of police, like in the case of the non-state Germanic
society of peers.8 4 This is why international public law
resorts to punitive interventions like economic sanctions,
very much reminiscent of the figure of outlawry typical for
legal traditions in societies without a state. Introducing a
transnational police would imply that one state holds
authority over another, disrespecting the independence
inherent in the notion of sovereignty.8 5 Mitchell Dean refers
to Schmitt's analysis of the decline of the European-based
system of international law8 6 with the return of the notion
of a just war, which seems to fit the logic of the pre-
Westphalian era in which the aim of a war could well be to
establish the power to police over another state after
conquering its territory or population.
The point of this excursion into the roots of sovereignty
is to trace the origins of the power to police in the
emergence of sovereignty over and against suzerainty. With
the advance of the power to legislate as the first attribute of
sovereignty at the beginnings of modernity, we encounter
the concomitant advance of the power to police, from an ad
hoc reactive power in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
to a more systematically developed science of police in the
absolute (police) states of seventeenth and eighteenth
century Europe. Other than what Agamben suggests,8 7 the
notion of police has always been a crucial part of the notion
of sovereignty, being the condition of possibility for an
84. See, e.g., WESEL, supra note 46, at 52-68 (discussing law in non-state
societies); see also E. Adamson Hoebel, Feud: Concept, Reality and Method in
the Study of Primitive Law, in 1 ESSAYS ON MODERNIZATION OF
UNDERDEVELOPED SOCIETIES 500 (A. R. Desai ed., 1972); SIMON ROBERTS, ORDER
AND DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1979).
85. A transnational police should not be confused with a supranational
police force which would imply some kind of supranational world government.
The adventures of United Nations peace-keeping forces seem to build on a
complex mix of national authority and international consensus struggling with
competing loyalties, ad hoc legal contraptions, and unstable power relations.
86. Dean, supra note 3, at 188-90.
87. Cf. Dubber, supra note 14, at 109 ("Sovereignty without the power to
police is no sovereignty at all"); Tomlins, supra note 4, at 259 (indicating that
Dubber in fact corrects Agamben's view that "the concept of sovereignty has
been . . . introduced into the figure of the police" only relatively recently
(referring to GIORGIO AGAMBEN, MEANS WITHOUT END: NOTES ON POLITICS 102
(Vincenzo Binetti & Cesare Casarino trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 2000) (1996))).
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effective power to legislate which is actually a part of the
original notion of the police. We shall return to this point in
the next section when discussing the implications of the
emergence of transnational governance for the power of
police.
D. From National Sovereignty to Global Empire?
In chapters seven and eight, the implications of
transnational violence are assessed for the new police
science. In the light of the historical move from suzerainty
to sovereignty, transnational violence raises many
questions. For example, to what extent does international
terrorism wipe out the difference between internal and
external enemies? Is the system of international law, built
on the idea of sovereign nation-states, crumbling under the
weight of police interventions by individual states on the
territory of other states, or is the system of international
law eroding due to an increasing number of failed states
that challenge the concept of the sovereign state as a viable
instrument to bring order in international affairs? How can
a national state defend itself and its citizens against fraud
and tax-evasion committed by transnational companies that
are not bound to a territory and are focused on capital flows
that acquire an ever more virtual nature? Does a concept
like sovereignty lose its meaning when concepts like
territory and population denote realities in flux that can no
longer serve as stable points of reference?8 8 Does it still
make sense to speak of a monopoly of violence in the
emerging world order, or should we speak of an emerging
world chaos that nourishes on crises, the way Naomi Klein
has recently suggested?8 9 More to the point, can the power
of police survive without the monopoly of violence? What
does law mean when the monopoly of violence does not
hold? The response to these questions may benefit from the
previous analysis because non-state societies are
characterized by the absence of such a monopoly and
suzerainty balances on the threshold of an emerging
88. MEANS SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL
TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2006).
89. NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM
(2007).
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monopoly of violence.
In chapter seven, Dean discusses Military Intervention
as "Police" Action? To begin with, he discusses Agamben's
claim that the first Gulf War finally introduced the concept
of sovereignty into the figure of the police, stating that
according to Agamben, "police operates within the 'decision'
on the 'state of exception,' which-following Carl Schmitt
(1922)-defines the operation of sovereignty."90 Agamben
argues that
[t]he investiture of the sovereign as policeman . . . makes it
necessary to criminalize the adversary .... Such an operation is
not obliged to respect any juridical rule and can thus make no
distinctions between the civilian population and soldiers, as well
as between the people and their criminal sovereign, thereby
returning to the most archaic conditions of belligerence.
9 1
Dean also notes that Agamben's allusions to police
unambiguously refer to "the extralegal use of violence by
sovereign authority."92 As explained in the previous section,
the problem with this position is that the police has always
been part of the workings of sovereignty. One could even
argue that the power of police can only be found in a
sovereign state that has pacified its population, clearing the
way for the positive, constructive dimension of the power of
police. The necessity to criminalize the adversary must
indeed be part of sovereignty because-as Chantal Mouffe
has aptly demonstrated 93-the difference between an
adversary and an enemy is the difference between inclusion
and exclusion, which is central to sovereignty. However, the
claim that criminalization implies that there are no
juridical rules to apply and the claim that criminalization
erases the distinction between civilians and soldiers, makes
no sense. Criminalization, like policing, presumes that the
adversary is within the jurisdiction of the sovereign,
meaning that the normal juridical rules apply except in the
case of emergency. Being indebted to Schmitt, Agamben's
point is that we live in an extended state of exception which
90. Dean, supra note 3, at 185.
91. Id. at 185-86 (quoting AGAMBEN, supra note 89, at 105).
92. Id. at 187.
93. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (2000).
2008] 581
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
implies that the rule of law is suspended on a permanent
basis. This, however, seems an artificial description of what
is actually at stake. The problems Agamben describes-
contrary to his opinion-relate to the decline of sovereignty.
For instance, the renewed prominence of the doctrine of the
just war, stemming from an era before sovereignty
consolidated, implies that the targets of transnational
violence against individual terrorists or rogue states are
neither adversaries nor enemies: they lack the protection of
both the criminal law (internal sovereignty) and the
protection of prisoners of war (external sovereignty).
Agamben's famous icon of the homo sacer, the outlaw, as
the subject of Schmittian sovereignty and Foucaldian bio-
power is equally flawed because-like the just war-this is
a figure stemming from an era before sovereignty emerged.
Rather than comparing the naked bodies assembled in the
Nazi camps to the outlaws in early Roman and Germanic
history, we should compare economic sanctions against
sovereign states to the Germanic or early Roman sanction
of outlawry.94 Similar flaws can be found in the position of
Hardt and Negri who emphasize the blurring of the borders
between the internal and external arms of power (thus
blurring one of the most central attributes of sovereignty),
while they still find that '[t]he juridical power to rule over
the exception and the capacity to deploy police force are
thus two initial coordinates that define the imperial model
of authority.' 95 Whereas Hardt and Negri refer to
Foucault's description of seventeenth and eighteenth
century police science, Dean rightly wonders:
[H]ow might this analysis be related to Empire's use of the term to
denote the form of exercise of imperial sovereign right? We are
nowhere offered a discussion of the trajectory of the notion of
police or an attempt to say how current police action is different
94. Agamben does not take the Germanic outlaw as a first point of reference
in his rhetorically brilliant discourse. He prefers the more mysterious homo
sacer, depicting him as an enigmatic figure of early Roman law, without
mentioning that the era of the homo sacer is the era of the old Roman Kings
whose position compares well to the medieval suzerain. Their monopoly of
violence was rudimentary if not simply non-existent, calling for other means to
sustain the law including participatory justice, outlawry, and ritual execution.
AGAMBEN, supra note 88, at 104.
95. Dean, supra note 3, at 186 (quoting HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 18, at
17).
582 [Vol. 56
A NEW SCIENCE OF POLICE?
from or similar to the police that existed across different European
territories in former times.
96
Actually, Foucault described seventeenth and eighteenth
century police as a pastoral power over a population,
emphasizing the productive character of the police of the
seventeenth and eighteenth century police science. Dean
rightly concludes that such an understanding of police
cannot limit itself to military interventions but should
"include agencies of global economic intervention (the World
Trade Organization [WTO], International Monetary Fund
[IMF], World Bank) and humanitarian and moral agencies
(nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]). '' 97 I would add
that the link between police and sovereignty implies a link
with an effective monopoly of violence with regard to a
territory or a population which is notably absent at the
global level. The rhetorical usage of "police" in international
relations-from Theodore Roosevelt's claim for the need to
exercise an international police power as stated in the
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine to the Dutch "police"
action in their Indonesian colony to Ignatieffs call for an
international police to implement Canadian Peace, Order,
and Good Government (POGG) throughout the world-
should not tempt us to mistake power politics for
government authority as we have no transnational
sovereignty and no monopoly on violence to depend on.98
Speaking of transnational violence in terms of police and
sovereignty may in fact blind us to the explosive
connections between the governmentality of a control
society with fuzzy borders and the governance of
transnational capital flows. I do think that Hardt and Negri
have a point here. The logic of governmentality and that of
governance have an interesting similarity even if their
objectives differ. However, neither thrives on unilateral
sovereign power, both work with "a specific and complex
96. Dean, supra note 3, at 186-87.
97. Id. at 187.
98. See id. at 190-91 (discussing Theodore Roosevelt's Corollary to the
Monroe Doctrine); Levi & Hagan, supra note 3, at 207-08 (also discussing
Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine); see also Valverde, supra note 19,
at 80-81 (discussing Michael Ignatieff s call for POGG powers in Canada); Levi
& Hagan, supra note 3, at 229-30 (also discussing Ignatieffs call for POGG
powers).
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form of power (institutions, procedures, analyses, tactics)
that 'has as its target population, as its principle form of
knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical
means apparatuses of security."' 99 The citation is from
Lindsay Farmer quoting Michel Foucault describing
governmentality, and this description holds to a large
degree for public and private models of governance. They
connect easily to what Deleuze has termed "societies of
control"-0 0 -the twentieth and twenty-first centuries follow-
up of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries' "disciplinary
societies"101 described by Foucault, which in their turn
followed the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of
"sovereign societies.' 0 2
Both governance and governmentality are capable of
functioning at transnational levels, connecting to the global
capitalist empire described by Hardt and Negri. The
paradigms on which sovereignty and governance thrive are,
however, less interoperable (to use a term that may be of
crucial relevance for policing in the information age). The
unilateral authority of sovereign power is at odds with the
dynamics of a negotiated governance as well as with the
intricate techniques, tactics, and institutional flexibility of
the governmentality of the "societies of control."'10 3
If, other than sovereignty, governmentality can function
at a transnational level, something like a transnational
police may be emerging beyond the scope of sovereignty,
interconnected with private governance of transnational
companies. Such a transnational police may be
uncontrollable in its controlling powers, but it could entail
the productive force for what Foucault called a little extra
life,' 04 in this case, for post-citizens in a post-sovereign
landscape. To call this post-sovereign transnational
99. Farmer, supra note 10, at 149 (quoting Michel Foucault,
Governmentality, in POWER 220 (J. D. Faubion ed., 2000)).
100. Gilles Deleuze, Postscript on the Societies of Control, 59 OCTOBER 3, 3
(1992).
101. Id.
102. See id. (describing "societies of sovereignty" as aiming "to tax rather
than to organize production, to rule on death rather than to administer life").
For a discussion of control societies, see infra Part III.D.
103. Deleuze, supra note 100, at 3.
104. See Dean, supra note 3, at 201.
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landscape a global empire is problematic for two reasons.
First, Hardt and Negri connect the notion of empire to a
new concept of sovereignty that is at odds with central
notions of sovereignty; and second, the use of the term
global may suggest an opposition with the local or the
national while the global in fact thrives on the local and the
national. I prefer using the notion of the "transnational" as
used by de Sousa Santos, 10 5 distinguishing it from both the
intrastate (national) and the interstate (international) or
even the suprastate (supranational) levels. This is not to
say that in a post-sovereign landscape the national state
has no role to play or to deny the role of international law,
but to emphasize that the emerging ecology of strong and
weak states, multinational companies, transnational capital
flows, and ICT socio-technical infrastructures cannot be
reduced to a single logic as Hardt and Negri seem to
suggest.
The uncontrollable nature of an emerging transnational
control society would evidently require the reinvention of
constitutional restrictions for policing powers that extend
far beyond the domestic realm. Despite Tomlins skepticism
about the role of law, 0 6 I tend to agree with Dean that
rather than reducing contemporary modernity to the camp with its
police command, it is important to analyze how the practices of the
camp can be subject to review and scrutiny-as they have been by
not only the liberal press in the United States but the recent
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.107
I will return to this point in Part III.D, Foucault Revisited:
Legalism and the Control Society.
In chapter eight, Ron Levi and John Hagan discuss
International Police. Interestingly, the focus of Levi and
Hagan is on international criminal law which has to
function at a fragile nexus of law and police because of the
absence of an effective monopoly on violence in the
international realm. Levi and Hagan intend to follow up on
Tomlins's Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American
105. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE:
LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION (2d ed. 2002).
106. See Tomlins, supra note 4, at 252.
107. Dean, supra note 3, at 203.
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Republic,0o investigating how law and police function as
alternative discourses and finding that "although legal
values are at first rhetorically displaced in favor of
guaranteeing security through police, the logic of police and
good administration is then posited as fundamental to
promoting the rule of law worldwide." 109 In the case of
international criminal law, the lack of an international
police constabulary forces the tribunals to "rely on often
hostile foreign states to voluntarily cooperate: and this
international separation of law from police has built in a
systematic limit to the field that, we suggest, likely ensures
that the most powerful nations will be exempt from its
authority."1 0 They conclude that when states refuse to
cooperate, the sanctions are diplomatic rather than coercive
or boiling down to naming and shaming rather than
punishment. This should not surprise us by now as the lack
of sovereignty in the international sphere implies that the
law depends on participatory justice (and outlawry) like in
the age of suzerainty. At the end of their chapter, Levy and
Hagan find that law and police have often developed along
separate tracks, both in domestic and in international
affairs, and they in fact observe a constant alternation of
police without law, and law without police."' Surprisingly,
they then conclude that police provides a defense to law,
and law to police, claiming that this mutual defense is
accomplished by the alternation of both. 1 2 This I find a
rather confusing conclusion after the extended analysis of
the problems that arise when law has to function without
police, or vice versa. However, the idea that law and police
can develop into interdependent domains, instead of law
being necessarily dependent on police, is a refreshing notion
in a volume that seems dedicated to skepticism regarding
the idea of bringing police under the rule of law.
108. CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993).
109. Levi & Hagan, supra note 3, at 232.
110. Id. at 233.
111. Id. at 238.
112. Id.
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III. THE CORE DICHOTOMY: LAW AND POLICE
A. Justice and Police: Fitting Anachronisms
The New Police Science produces a splitting image of
law and police. Before moving into a critique of the
opposition of law as legalism and police as an independent
power of police, I will again make an historical detour. The
courage to introduce challenging anachronisms, such as the
old notion of police as government, involves the need to look
into the relationship between the relevant terms and the
web of meaning in which they function. To this end, we
shall discuss the "other" of police in the time of its
inception. This "other" was justice, which according to
Farmer in chapter five, The Jurisprudence of Security: The
Police Power and the Criminal Law, must be "seen as the
principles governing the public and private relations
between persons (particularly with respect to the security of
property)"113 while standing in a tension with "criminal law,
seen as security.11 4 Though I am not an expert in the
history of Anglo-American law, from the perspective of
continental Europe it would be interesting to look into the
shifting relationships between justice and police within the
framework of medieval, early-modern, and modern
Europe. 115  Other than what Farmer concludes for
eighteenth century England, from a continental perspective
the domain of the criminal law originally fell within the
scope of justice, which consisted of civil and criminal law, as
administered in accusatorial procedures during the middle
ages. Justice must be understood here as a concept
referring to criminal and civil jurisdiction, taking into
account that many public interventions fell within the scope
of the civil jurisdiction, requiring governments to go to court
to get their way.11 6 With the advent of the modern state, a
113. Farmer, supra note 10, at 146-47.
114. Id. (referring to ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 103-40 (R.
L. Meek et al. eds., 1978)).
115. See Mireille Hildebrandt, Justice and Police: Regulatory Offenses and
the Criminal Law, NEW CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008 or 2009); JAN VOLKERT
RIJPPERDA WIERDSMA, POLITIE EN JUSTITIE (1937) (discussing the various shifts
in the relationships between justice and police).
116. See RIJPPERDA WIERDSMA, supra note 116, at 73.
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new domain of government intervention emerged outside
the realm of justice-the domain of police. This domain
consisted of legislative, and other measures, meant to
create and maintain what Valverde so aptly summarizes as
the Canadian mantra of "peace, order and good
government."'117 Here we have the old notion of police as the
core of the new police science. Concurrent with the
beginnings of the domain of police, we can observe an
increasing importance of the inquisitorial procedure which
actually introduced the hierarchical model of the power of
police into the domain of justice. Two things must be taken
to heart: first, the notion of the police developed outside the
domain of justice; and second, its logic infiltrated the
criminal trial in continental Europe which nevertheless
remained a part of the domain of justice. Interestingly,
another shift occurred in nineteenth century continental
Europe when civil law was privatized in the sense that
public interventions were expelled from the domain of
justice. Civil law and private law became synonymous since
the French Code Civil restricted the scope of civil justice to
private law. During the nineteenth century, this meant that
governments had an extended separate sphere of
unrestricted police power. This freedom to govern was
theorized by legal philosophers, like Friedrich Julius Stahl,
advocating a strict separation of justice and police which
meant that citizens had no recourse to a court of law
against government interventions falling within the scope
of the police. 118 The idea that the power of police is
indefinable as well as unlimited seems to derive from this
nineteenth century perspective, fitting well in the formal
conception of the Rechtsstaat as argued by Stahl-heralding
a procedural understanding of the rule of law (requiring
rule by but not of law) rather than a substantive notion of
the rule of law (which implies providing the legal means to
contest the authority of the state in a court of law). 1 9
117. Valverde, supra note 19, at 73.
118. FRIEDRICH JULIUS STAHL, DIE PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS (1878).
119. Id.
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B. From Undivided Sovereignty to the Paradox of the
Rechtsstaat
The formal conception of the Rechtsstaat was, however,
complemented by a substantive conception of the
Rechtsstaat.120 The difference between both conceptipns
compares well to the difference between the French Etat
l6gal and Etat de droit.121 The formal conception of the
Rechtsstaat divides the powers of the state between the
legislator and the administration: the first sets out the
rules for the second to follow. The task of the judge is-like
that of the administration-to apply the rules enacted by
the legislature. His task is administrative and applies to
the behavior of citizens, not to the actions of the
administration which is deemed to either follow the
statutes or to exercise the power to police (in a domain
outside the law). 122 The Etat ligal entails the same
legalism; only in this case, the administration has no space
outside the will of the legislature. Due to the concept of the
volontg ggndrale,123 the legislator is the highest power in the
state, meaning that the administration must rule in
accordance with the enacted law at all times (no separate
domain outside the law). Thesubstantive conceptions of the
Rechtsstaat, as well as the Etat de droit, introduce a new
understanding of sovereignty: instead of an undivided
sovereign they envision an internal division that allows the
judiciary to check the actions of the administration (and
even of the legislator). Instead of presuming that the
legislator and the administration will always act in the
general interest, their actions are made contestable in a
court of law. It is only then that legalism is relativized
while at the same time the power of police is brought under
the rule of law. Interestingly, the end of legalism is also the
120. See ROBERT VON MOHL, DIE POLIZEI-WISSENSCHAFT NACH DEN
GRUNDSATZEN DES RECHTSSTAATES (Adamant Media Corp. 2000) (1832).
121. See CHEVALLIER, supra note 54, at 29-35.
122. See JAMES GOLDSCHMIDT, DAS VERWALTUNGSSTRAFRECHT (1902)
(discussing the saliency of the history of this typically nineteenth century
German domain of police, outside the realm of law); see also HANS GERHARD
MICHELS, STRAFBARE HANDLUNG UND ZUWIDERHANDLUNG (1963).
123. Rousseau's concept of volontg gdndrale (the general will) has inspired
the French Revolution and political theory. It refers to the political will of the
people as expressed by the legislator, see CHEVALLIER, supra note 54, at 25.
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recognition of discretion, both in law and in the police; the
rule of law, however, means that this discretion does not
imply arbitrary rule as its use can be contested in the light
of the principles of fair play and due process. 124 Law as well
as police are fundamentally underdetermined, both
conceptually and in their application; this does not equate
with indeterminacy which would lead to chaos and
substantial legal insecurity, destroying the constructive
dimensions of both police and law. The paradox of the
Rechtsstaat develops from this internal division of
sovereignty: the state's power of police can be contested in a
court of law that derives its authority from the same
state. 125 Obviously, such an arrangement depends on the
institutional sustainability of the internal divisions;
crossovers will flood the system and result in a return to
undivided sovereignty which is equivalent with the police
state. The rule of law is not a necessary truth but a
vulnerable historical artifact that needs to be sustained in
the face of recurring threats to collapse into either chaos or
undivided sovereignty. 126
In the following section, we will have a look at the way
the authors defend the separate spheres of law and police.
Do they use historical, theoretical, philosophical, or
empirical arguments? Do they applaud the separation or
simply find it to be inevitable? Do they suggest remedies
other than a critical stance? I will discuss two recurring
arguments that form a mix of historical and theoretical
points. The first concerns the proposition that law simply
depends on the power to police which is, for this reason,
prior to and separate from the law (a rather Schmittian
argument). The second equates law with legalism and
challenges its effectiveness in the face of the control society
124. For a comparison of continental and Anglo-Saxon notions of the rule of
law, see Rainer Grote, Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and Etat de droit, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, UNIVERSALISM AND DEMOcRACY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
269 (Christian Starck ed., 1999).
125. See MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, STRAF(BEGRIP) EN PROCESBEGINSEL 254-71,
429-68 (2002) (discussing the shift from suzerainty to sovereignty to its internal
division under the rule of law).
126. I thank Rend Foqu6 and Joest't Hart for the way their oeuvre has
sensitized me to the fragile historicity of the paradox of the Rechtsstaat. See,
e.g., REN9 FOQUE & A.C.'T HART, INSTRUMENTALITEIT EN RECHTSBESCHERMING:
GRONDSLAGEN VAN EEN STRAFRECHTELIJKE WAARDENDISCUSSIE (1990).
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(a Foucaldian inspired argument) understood in terms of
sovereignty (mixing Foucault with Schmitt) or
governmentality (staying with Foucault's challenge of the
actual impact of sovereign power in contemporary society).
C. Does Law Depend on the Power to Police?
One of the recurrent points made is the fact that the
law actually depends on the power to police. This point
relates to the monopoly of violence established during the
late Middle Ages which is both the condition of possibility
for an effective police in the broader sense of the term and
the result of an effective police in the more narrow sense of
the constabulary force. There is mutual causality between
the power of police, the monopoly of violence, and the police
force. The book gives little or no explicit attention to the
monopoly of violence. This seems to me a missed chance.
Actually, the monopoly of violence seems to be the missing
link between the old notion of the police and its recent
reduction. Especially when the monopoly on violence of the
national state is challenged from within as well as from
without, as the last two chapters in the book demonstrate,
it can no longer be taken for granted and the consequences
of its fragility must be assessed.
The subjection of peers to the medieval "bannum"'127 of
the king and the concomitant "ban" on vigilance eventually
led to the criminalization of actions that implicate taking
the law into one's own hands. 128 This criminalization
required the institutionalization of a police force to be
effective. 129 The establishment of an effective monopoly on
127. The "bannum" of the king referred to the competence of the (early)
medieval kings to issue regulations as well as to the fine ("ban") imposed on
those who violated them. See the entry of the "ban" in the eleventh edition of
the Encyclopeadia Britannica, first published in 1911, available at
http://www.191lencyclopedia.org/Ban.
128. See Agamben's discussion of the medieval "ban" in supra note 49, pt. 1,
sec. 1.7 and pt. 2, sec. 6. Though he recognizes the medieval character of the
"ban," he relates it to sovereignty instead of suzerainty (which stands for an
entirely different political structure, as explained above).
129. See BERMAN, supra note 17, at 88-94 (discussing the historical
construction and emergence of the monopoly on violence in the late middle ages
as a result of the new division of tasks between church and secular
government); see also DUBBER, supra note 66, at 11-21 (discussing the king's
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violence, and the ensuing pacification of a population, mark
the threshold to a new type of society. The novelty is
twofold: first, the pacification relieves the former peers from
their duty to engage in private revenge; and second, the
peers are turned into subjects of a sovereign. This may
sound like bad news but this subjectivation also contains
the germs of the move from subject to citizen, combining the
pacification of society with the positive freedom to
participate in the construction of the public sphere.
Subjectivation in the sense of objectification, becoming an
object of the king's household as Dubber would say, can
thus trigger subjectivation in the sense of creating agency
in the political sphere: citizenship. 130 This evidently does
not imply a necessary move from peer to subject to citizen.
The constructive dimension of the power of police that
depends on the pacification of a population can in fact be
used, as Neocleous rightly indicates, to create a society that
produces insecurity and inequality to sustain the
objectification of the resources of the household:
Poverty is that state and condition in society where the individual
has no surplus labour in store, and, consequently, no property but
what is derived from the constant exercise of industry in the
various occupations of life; or in other words, it is the state of every
one who must labour for subsistence.
Poverty is therefore a most necessary and indispensable ingredient
in society, without which nations and communities could not exist
in a state of civilization. It is the lot of man-it is the source of
wealth ....
Indigence therefore, and not poverty, is the evil .... It is the state
of any one who is destitute of the means of subsistence, and is
unable to labour to procure it to the extent nature requires. The
natural source of subsistence is the labour of the individual; while
that remains with him he is denominated poor; when it fails in
whole or in part he becomes indigent.
13 1
peace as an extension of his mund into a "general safeguard of public order"
(quoting FREDRICK POLLOCK & FREDRIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, I THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 45 (2d ed. 1898))).
130. See Dubber & Valverde, supra note 4.
131. Neocleous, supra note 1, at 30-31 (quoting PATRICK COLQUHOUN, A
TREATISE ON INDIGENCE 7-8 (1806)).
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This is Neocleous's insightful quotation from early
nineteenth century police science written by Patrick
Colquhoun, an early police theorist in Britain who seems to
spell out Marxist theory just before Marx was born. 132
Colquhoun was the advocate of the metropolitan police and
the initiator of the police of the river Thames. He was
involved in the deliberate and premeditated construction of
a class of poor people that must, firstly, be kept in a state of
poverty; secondly, prevented from becoming indigent and;
thirdly, repressed when ending up criminal. He has in fact
traveled a long way from Adam Smith who is quoted by
Farmer to have lectured some thirty years earlier:
[T]hat in Glasgow, "where each one seldom has but one man
servant, there are few or no capitall [sic] crimes committed, and
those that are, most commonly by strangers; whereas at
Edinburgh, where the resort of the nobility and gentry draws
together a vast number of servants who are frequently set adrift
by their masters, there are severall [sic] every year." The control of
crime thus depended as much on the management of the economy
and the production of social wealth, which would reduce the
number of servants and dependents, as on creating new laws or
placing greater numbers of constables on the streets.
13 3
It may seem that Smith's and Colquhoun's diagnoses of
the causes of criminality coincide as both are aware that
poverty and dependence can lead to indigence and
eventually criminal behavior. However, while Smith takes a
stance against such dependence and argues for the
production of social wealth, Colquhoun argues for the
production of poverty as an indispensable source of wealth.
Smith is not impressed with raising the number of
constables on the streets, of which Colquhoun was an
ardent advocate, as Smith believes that reducing poverty
will have a more beneficial effect on crime rates. This
sounds like a familiar position, though not often voiced by
contemporary believers in the invisible hand of a free
market.
The power of police-whether used to promote poverty
or to produce social wealth-depends on an effective
monopoly of violence, and so does law in the modern state.
132. See id.
133. Farmer, supra note 10, at 146 (quoting SMITH, supra note 10, at 333).
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Instead of claiming that the law depends on the power of
police, I would argue that both modern law and the power
of police depend on the monopoly of violence. This, being a
descriptive point, needs qualification if we address the
relationship between law and the power of police in
constitutional democracy, requiring a normative stance. In
that case, the power of police will have to be brought under
the rule of law, meaning that the monopoly of violence on
which both depend, can be invoked against actions (to be)
performed within the realm of the power of police. This is-
perhaps-turning Carl Schmitt inside out. The sovereign is
the one who decides about the state of exception or, in other
words, the one who holds the monopoly on violence. In as
far as modern law depends on the monopoly of violence, the
sovereign seems to be both inside and outside the law. But,
as far as constitutional democracy is at stake, the sovereign
is bound by the dictates of the law in deciding about the
state of emergency. The law will then contain rules about
which subdivision of the sovereign prepares the decision,
about the criteria that must be fulfilled to declare the
emergency, as well as rules about its duration and ex ante
and post hoc accountability. These dictates of the law will
indeed leave room for discretion: like the power of police,
the law is underdetermined, but-like the power of police in
constitutional democracy-not indeterminate or unlimited.
D. Foucault Revisited: Legalism and the Control Society
Elsewhere, I made an analysis of Foucault's
penetrating description of the legal process as a means to
produce truth.134 One of his well-known points is that the
liberal invocation of classical Enlightenment philosophy to
celebrate the criminal process as a means against arbitrary
punishment did not prevent disciplinary practices from
establishing a contradictory logic of surveillance and control
at the core of the criminal justice system: the prison. This
theme has been further developed by Deleuze in his
Postscripts on the Societies of Control,135 already mentioned
134. See Mireille Hildebrandt, The Trial of the Expert: Epreuve and Preuve,
10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 78, 83 (2007) (referring to Michel Foucault, La Vgritd et
les formes juridiques, in II DITS ET ECRITS 538-647 (1994) and MICHEL FOUCAULT,
SURVEILLER ET PUNIR: NAISSANCE DE LA PRISON (1975)).
135. Deleuze, supra note 102, at 3. Cf. STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL
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above, in which Deleuze describes a move from fixed
individualization and categorization in confined institutions
(disciplinary practices) to real time monitoring and
surveillance of the dynamic relationships between flexible,
mobile entities (control societies). The emphasis shifts from
the production of static identities to the production of
relevant difference, always in search of the difference that
makes a difference. 136 Policing, in as far as it builds on
advanced risk analysis and on refined criminal profiling,
seems to take part in this paradigm shift. In fact, justice
itself is said to be infested with this new logic, turning into
an actuarial justice that flouts the principles of
constitutional democracy and becoming the handmaiden of
a power of police beyond the rule of law. 137 If we stay with
Foucault, however, we should not conflate the power of
police in an emerging control society with sovereignty but
associate it with the subtle techniques of a new
governmentality: a multiplicity of profiling practices in
intermingling private and public spheres; productive
regulatory devices with a massive potential for function;
and visions of Ambient Intelligence and nano-technological
applications that produce and thrive on real time profiling.
If law was incapable of resisting the erosion of its core
principles brought about by disciplinary practices like the
prison, one wonders how it could possibly resist the effects
of a power of police that integrates transnational, private,
and public control mechanisms into the workings of what
Hardt and Negri have called a global empire that has no
central point of reference, no intentions, just an unfolding
logic of dynamically differentiated control. 138 Building on
Marx, Foucault, and Deleuze, speaking of a capitalist
sovereignty that produces deterritorialization and
CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND CLASSIFICATION (1985); DAVID GARLAND, THE
CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
(2001).
136. See Mireille Hildebrandt, Profiling: From Data to Knowledge, 30 DuD:
DATENSCHUTZ UND DATENSICHERHEIT 1 (2006); see also Mireille Hildebrandt,
Profiling into the Future: An Assessment of Profiling Technologies in the Context
of Ambient Intelligence, 1 J. IDENTITY INFO. SOC'Y 1 (2007), available at
http://journal.fidis.net/fileadmin/journalissues/1-2007/Profiling-into-the-future.pdf.
137. See, e.g., Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, Actuarial Justice: The
Emerging New Criminal Law, in THE FUTURES OF CRIMINOLOGY 173 (David
Nelken ed., 1994).
138. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 18.
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reterritorialization, turning nation states into instruments
of a global capitalism, Hardt and Negri's concept of a global
empire denotes a logic that unfolds itself rather than an
institution that can be addressed. Their new concept of
sovereignty, discussed in Part II.D, From National
Sovereignty to Global Empire?, seems to denote an
anonymous machine from which we cannot expect the kind
of institutional support that an internally divided
sovereignty could provide. 139 Precisely because it is not an
institution but an anonymous logic, I would argue that the
rule of law has no way to come to grips with such "imperial
power."'140 As discussed above, I reject the idea that this
unfolding logic is aptly described as a new type of global
sovereignty, but agree that it may entail a new type of
governmentality, playing out in a post-sovereign,
transnational landscape that shares many features of
Deleuze's "societies of control."'1
41
In my discussion of Foucault's opposition of disciplinary
practices and classical legalism, I contended that Foucault
saliently described the impotence of classical liberal
legalism which fails to come to terms with the police
understood as governmentality. However, he seems to
equate the rule of law with the nineteenth century French
Etat l4gal and German formal conception of the Rechtsstaat.
In thus reducing law to legalism, he misses out on the ideal
type of the Etat de droit and the substantial conception of
the Rechtsstaat, as described above. The paradox of the
Rechtsstaat is a historical artifact that cannot be taken for
granted, and I would agree with Tomlins that "critical
inquiry into the production and purposes of police that is
not at the same time critical inquiry into the production
and purposes of law"'42 is inadequate. However, if one
starts the inquiry with a mindset that equates rule of law
with legalism (a term often employed in the book), law will
indeed easily turn out to be a neutral instrument of the
power of police or a rhetorical device to legitimate the
operations of a self-sufficient power of police.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See Deleuze, supra note 102.
142. Tomlins, supra note 4, at 252.
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In the face of a post-sovereign, transnational
governmentality that builds on Deleuze's control society,
the paradox of the Rechtsstaat would need reinvention. The
combination of governmentality and governance-
mentioned in Part II.D., From National Sovereignty to
Global Empire?--could destroy the fragile balance between
the constructive power of police and its countervailing"other," the law. As it is, the post-sovereign landscape offers
no point of reference that can lend its authority to the
contestation of its operations. In fact, I would claim it has
no authority whatsoever, but only flows of dynamic,
relational power which can be resisted but not contested on
its own ground-like public authority can-in constitutional
democracy. With Tomlins, I would be skeptical of easy
solutions at this point as we simply have no clue how to
organize a formal space for contestation without depending
on the state(s). But with Dean, I would think that we must
get down to business and invent ways to subject the
operations of an emerging "global empire" to scrutiny and
review, necessitating the construction of new transnational
institutions capable of sustaining a transnational empire of
law.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In Civilizing Security, Ian Loader and Neil Walker
claim that security must be civilized while at the same time
security is civilizing. 143 This counter-punctual reading of
civilizing security comes close to describing the relationship
between the rule of law and the power of police in a
constitutional democracy: 144 the power of police is a
productive power, capable of providing security and of
building socio-technical infrastructures to promote social
welfare thus civilizing the landscape we inhabit; the rule of
law is an equally productive power capable of providing
legal certainty and of constructing the constraints that
make the exercise of the power of police contestable. To
what extent the power of police and the rule of law manage
143. See LOADER & WALKER, supra note 33.
144. "Counter-punctual" is not standard English but it is meant to refer to a
punctual reading of the phrase resulting in two meaningful phrases that
entertain a relation of a counterpoint.
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to act in counterpoint, instead of the one overruling the
other, is a matter of investigation. In arguing that the
power of police must be brought under the rule of law, I do
not claim that law should overrule police as this would
actually paralyze the law. My point is that the discretionary
power of police needs legal checks and balances without
thereby destroying the discretion. However, the recurrent
opposition of an impotent legalism and unlimited police
power, that seems to inform many of the contributions, may
be attributed to the authors' justified opposition to the
defensive strategies developed by contemporary lawyers in
the face of an increasingly unconstrained exercise of the
power to police. Perhaps positivist legalism with its charade
of legal security is used to legitimize unjustified
applications of rules that should have been interpreted
differently, implying that the authors are right in their
rejection of legalist positivism but not in their equation of
law with legalism. Another pitfall of legal positivism is its
impotence in the face of the transnational governmentality
and the force of non-positive law 'like the new lex
mercatoria. Though I have qualified my objections against
Hardt and Negri's concept of global capitalist sovereignty, I
do fear that a transnational control society as depicted by
Deleuze and others is in fact unfolding while we have not
yet developed the conceptual and institutional tools to
reinvent constitutional democracy beyond the national
state. The New Police Science offers many arguments to
sustain this fear, inviting scholars of a variety of relevant
disciplines to further investigate the historicity and the
actual workings of the power of police. I hope that lawyers
will have the good sense to continue this investigation and
to use their legal imagination to invent new checks and
balances to sustain the rule of law, which, due to its fragile
historicity, cannot be taken for granted.
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